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In 1970 Richard Baker and James McConnell applied for a marriage
license in Hennepin County, Minnesota. When the county clerk denied their
application because they were both men, the couple went to court. But the trial
court upheld the clerk's action, and the state supreme court affirmed.' The
Minnesota court ruled that same-sex couples have no legal right to marry
because marriage is and always has been an inherently heterosexual institution,
"a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing
of children."'2 Other courts have agreed: Same-sex couples are excluded from
marriage by the nature of marriage itself. When two Kentucky women claimed
a constitutional right to marry, for example, the state's highest court rejected
their suit with the observation: "It appears to us that appellants are prevented
from marrying, not by the statutes of Kentucky or the refusal of the County
Court Clerk of Jefferson County to issue them a license, but rather by their
own incapability of entering into a marriage as that term is defined."3
1. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed for lack of substantial federal
question, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). Although the Supreme Court's dismissal of Baker has the effect of a
decision on the merits, its value as precedent is substantially reduced by the intervening 23 years of privacy
precedents, including Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding that right to marry is fundamental).
2. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186.
3. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973). In addition to Jones and Baker, cases holding
that same-sex couples do not have a legal right to marry include: Dean v. District of Columbia, No. 90-
13892 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 2, 1992); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1971); De
Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App.),
review denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1008 (1974); see also Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D. Cal.
1980) (holding that even if same-sex marriage were valid under state law, such marriage would not confer
spouse status under federal Immigration and Nationality Act), aff'd, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
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This Note argues that these courts are wrong: The constitutional right of
privacy requires states to sanction and recognize same-sex marriages.4 There
is nothing intrinsic to the legal institution of marriage that excludes same-sex
couples from it. Viewed functionally, legal marriage is essentially a binding
commitment uniting two intimately related adults, a commitment which
sustains the relationship between such adults by structuring their dealings with
each other and with third parties. Conceived in this way, marriage is
indifferent to the relative genders of its occupants. And because marriage is not
intrinsically closed to same-sex couples, the fundamental right to
marry-which is a core element of the constitutional right of privacy-also
extends to such couples.5
The right to marry is not entirely unproblematic. It differs from other
rights protected under the rubric of "privacy," such as procreation, abortion,
or child rearing, because marriage is not something that exists apart from the
law or the state. Marriage is a legal relationship, entered into through a legal
framework, and enforceable according to legal rules. Law stands at its very
core. Due to this inherent "legalness" of marriage, the constitutional right to
marry cannot be secured simply by removing legal barriers to something that
exists outside of the law. Rather, the law itself must create the "thing" to
which one has a right. As a result, the right to marry necessarily imposes an
affirmative obligation on the state to establish this legal framework.
The legalness of marriage also gives rise to the definitional difficulties that
surfaced when Richard Baker and James McConnell first sought a marriage
license in Minnesota. The disagreement between the couple and the state about
whether the fundamental right to marry extends to same-sex couples reflected
a more profound disagreement about what marriage is. Resolving this deeper
458 U.S. 1111 (1982). The first and, as yet, only American case to have ruled in favor of a challenge to
a prohibition of same-sex marriage is Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), in which the Hawaii
Supreme Court held that the state's prohibition on same-sex marriage employs a facial gender classification
subject to strict scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitution's equal protection provision and equal rights
amendment. Id. at 64-67. The court remanded for a consideration of any compelling state interests that
might justify the gender classification. Baehr also ruled, however, that same-sex couples, unlike opposite-
sex couples, do not have afundamental right to marry. Id. at 57. For further discussion of Baehr, see infra
note 8 and notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
4. More precisely, the right of privacy requires states to recognize same-sex marriages unless there
are countervailing state interests that are sufficiently weighty to satisfy an "intermediate" level of
constitutional scrutiny. See infra note 46. This Note argues that same-sex couples have a fundamental right
to marry, but it does not consider whether there are countervailing state interests that might outweigh that
right.
5. This claim may at first appear to conflict with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which
held that the right of privacy does not prevent states from criminalizing sexual conduct involving same-sex
couples. However, as Part IV of this Note demonstrates, the fundamental right to many does not depend
on an anterior right to engage in sexual conduct outside of marriage. See infra notes 115-29 and
accompanying text. The primary concern of the right of privacy is not sexual conduct, but the formation
of families: The state may not interfere with basic familial decisions, including decisions relating to
marriage. Quite simply, the right to marry is fundamental. E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384
(1978); see also infra Part II. As a result, this right may not be infringed simply because the state has an
otherwise legitimate interest in regulating sexual conduct.
1496 [Vol. 103: 1495
Same-Sex Marriage
disagreement poses special difficulties. Since marriage is a legal relationship,
its definition cannot be derived from something that exists outside of the law.
At the same time, existing legal definitions of marriage cannot be accepted as
self-validating, as a positivistic view of law might otherwise suggest, because
the fundamental right to marry prohibits states from defining marriage in ways
that unduly exclude some couples from it.6 On the surface, then, it appears
that neither the law nor anything outside the law can provide a dispositive
definition of marriage.
This Note attempts to dissolve this dilemma by taking a holistic approach
to the law governing marriage. Such an approach does not look outside the law
for a definition of marriage, but it also does not accept specific legal
exclusions from marriage at face value. Rather, it tests specific exclusions by
asking whether they are connected to the functions of marriage as these are
reflected in the law as a whole.7 This Note develops its understanding of
marriage by moving between analyses of the state law of domestic relations
and analyses of the constitutional law of privacy. The primary objective is to
derive an interpretation of legal marriage against which the exclusion of same-
sex couples can be tested. A secondary goal is to use the resulting
understanding of marriage to illuminate the constitutional right of privacy, and
thus to clarify how marriage furthers the liberty interests of the couple by
imposing an affirmative obligation on the state.8
6. See infra Part II.A.; see also Mark Strasser, Family, Definitions, and the Constitution, 25 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 981, 982-89 (1991) (arguing that legislatures may not circumvent constitutional limits on
regulation of marriage simply by stipulating preferred definition of marriage).
7. To an earlier generation of Legal Realists, this mode of inquiry might have seemed like
"transcendental nonsense," or the variety of confusion that results when courts treat legal categories as
things whose essential properties can be read off from them. Such arguments appear to move in a circle
because their legal conclusions simply reflect the way in which the law has defined these legal "things."
See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 813,
passim (1935). Same-sex marriage cases frequently engage in precisely this type of "tautological
jurisprudence" when they reify the state's own legal definition of marriage in order to validate that very
definition. See Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, I LAW' & SEXUALITY 9,
13-14 (1991). Yet the apparent circularity of much legal reasoning need not be fatal tautology. Instead, it
may be an instance of the "hermeneutic circle" that is intrinsic in every interpretive endeavor as it shuttles
between anticipatory interpretations of a complete text and detailed readings of its parts. See HANS-GEORG
GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 235-37 (Crossroad Publ. Co. 1975) (1965). Such a hermeneutic circle is
implicit in the holistic approach that this Note takes to the law.
8. This Note does not address a closely related issue: whether the prohibition of same-sex marriage
employs a (quasi-)suspect classification and thereby violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
As the Hawaii Supreme Court recently demonstrated in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), this
equal protection question can be answered without any inquiry into the nature of marriage itself, because
the prohibition of same-sex marriage employs a facial classification based on the relative genders of the
parties. In view of this gender classification, Baehr held that the state's prohibition of same-sex marriage
is subject to strict scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitution. Id. at 64, 67, 74-75 (remanding for consideration
of any compelling state interest that might justify classification). The use of a facial gender classification
should require heightened scrutiny even when (as Baehr also held) same-sex couples do not have a
fundamental right to marry. Id. at 55-57; see also infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
Other courts have rejected equal protection challenges to the prohibition of same-sex marriage. It is
not always clear, however, whether these courts hold that this marriage prohibition does not employ a
gender classification at all, or whether they hold that the use of such a gender classification does not require
heightened scrutiny because marriage is (allegedly) an inherently gendered institution. See, e.g., Baker v.
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The argument proceeds in four stages. Part I develops a provisional
definition of legal marriage by inquiring into the functions it uniquely serves.
From this functional perspective, marriage appears simply as a legal framework
for a committed relationship between two adults, without regard to their
genders. Part II examines the case law surrounding the constitutional right to
marry and presents the courts' alternative interpretation of marriage, which
centers on procreation and is thought inherently to exclude same-sex couples.
Part II criticizes this procreative interpretation of marriage as unsupported by
state domestic relations law. Finally, Part IV argues that linking the right to
marry with procreation is also inconsistent with the broader constitutional right
of privacy. There is therefore no basis for limiting the fundamental right to
marry to opposite-sex couples.
I. WHY MARRIAGE? THE FUNCTION OF A LEGAL STATUS
One way to approach the problem of defining legal marriage is to ask what
functions it serves that other legal institutions do not. This Part pursues this
inquiry by focusing on what same-sex couples would gain if their right to
marry were legally recognized. The answer that emerges is that marriage
provides a legal framework for a committed relationship between two adults,
a framework that cannot be duplicated by other legal forms.9
Discussions of same-sex marriage frequently focus on the issue of
"benefits," that is, on the pecuniary advantages that third parties sometimes
bestow on married couples.'0 Logically, however, an analysis of marriage
Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Singer v. Ham, 522
P.2d 1187, 1191-92 (Wash. Ct. App.), review denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1008 (1974).
An extensive academic literature analyzes the prohibition of same-sex marriage in equal protection
terms. Particularly noteworthy are Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573 (1973)
(arguing that prohibitions of same-sex marriage would violate anticipated federal Equal Rights
Amendment); Comment, Homosexuals' Right To Marry, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 193 (1979) (undertaking equal
protection analysis based on sexual orientation); Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation Analogy:
Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE LJ. 145, 147 (1988) (arguing that sodomy laws that are
targeted specifically against same-sex couples, like antimiscegenation laws, violate equal protection by
maintaining caste regime locking some people into inferior racial or gender roles at birth); Hunter, supra
note 7, at 14-17 (extending Koppelman-type argument to prohibitions of same-sex marriage); James
Trosino, Note, American Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage and the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REV.
93 (1993) (same).
9. Parts II through IV, infra, confirm this functional reading by testing it against other aspects of the
law relating to marriage.
10. See, e.g., Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in LESBIANS, GAY MEN,
AND THE LAW" 404, 405 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993) (arguing that economic benefits unfairly
privilege marriage and that same-sex couples should therefore not seek right to many); Rhonda R. Rivera,
Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-Eighties, 11 U. DAYTON L. REV. 275, 325 (1986) (stating
that most same-sex couples seek equal economic benefits for their relationships, rather than marriage);
Thomas Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right To Marty, in LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE
LAV, supra, at 398, 399 (arguing that same-sex couples should seek right to marry in part to get economic
benefits); Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1604
(1989) (listing economic benefits denied as consequence of nonrecognition of same-sex marriages).
Stoddard lists several benefits of marriage that are supplied by the government (e.g., potentially reduced
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should begin by examining the legal relationship that unites the two individuals
who marry one another, not their relationships with third parties. When two
individuals marry, they enter into a legally binding relationship with each
other. This relationship is binding because the state imposes significant
conditions on exiting it; a spouse cannot simply walk away from marriage."
Marriage thus offers a legal medium through which two adults can make a
mutual commitment to stay together. This mutual commitment functions as a
relatively stable basis upon which they can structure aspects of their life
together and their joint interactions with third parties. In short, marriage allows
a couple to overcome the deep-seated individualism of contemporary life and
to operate, for many purposes, as a unit.'
2
On this reading, marriage is an enabling constraint which resembles
contract. Like contract, marriage can only be entered by the mutual consent of
the parties. Yet marriage has usually been treated as a status, not a contract,
because its terms have traditionally been set by the state and have not been
renegotiable by the parties.' 3 Although in recent years contract has come to
provide a significant alternative to marital status for governing the reciprocal
economic relations of couples, marriage remains a status-based relation
inasmuch as the state continues to regulate the conditions under which a couple
may terminate its relationship. It is in this latter respect that the status of
marriage provides a unique legal resource for structuring intimate relationships,
a resource whose function cannot be duplicated by other legal media.
Until recently, marital property rights were defined exclusively by the
state. Married couples could not use prenuptial agreements to negotiate their
mutual property rights in case of divorce, because such agreements were
generally held void as collusive attempts to obtain a divorce. 14 Similarly,
tax liability, certain Social Security benefits, rights of intestate succession, and rights of foreign spouses
to reside in the United States) and others that are customarily supplied by private parties such as employers
(e.g., medical benefits for spouses). Stoddard, supra, at 399.
11. See infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
12. This conception of marriage is related to that advocated in Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of
Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980). Karst argues that marriage is important for a same-sex
couple's freedom of intimate association because it is "a formalized legal status that recognizes their union
and commitment." Id. at 684. Karst sees the value of this legal status primarily in symbolic terms, as a
medium through which the couple can express their personal commitment in a socially acceptable manner.
In contrast, this Note lays greater stress on the fact that marriage can provide a stable legal basis for a
couple's relationship by allowing them to make a legally binding commitment to each other. Advocates
of same-sex marriage have probably played down this legally binding aspect of marriage because the battle
against criminal sanctions on same-sex sexual activity has entrenched a general hostility in the gay and
lesbian community to state "interference" in intimate relationships. Cf. William B. Rubenstein, The
Regulation of Lesbian and Gay Sexuality, in LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW, supra note 10, at 77,
77 (stating that existence of criminal sodomy laws has been used to "justify" general discrimination against
gays and lesbians). This Note argues that the state exercises unwarranted control over intimate relationships
not only through the application of criminal sanctions, but also by denying access to certain legal
institutions, including marriage.
13. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888); Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480, 483 (1863);
JOSEPH STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 108 (Boston, Little & Brown, 3d ed. 1846).
14. See Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 382-83 (Fla. 1970).
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unmarried couples could not use contract to mimic the state's marital property
regime, because such contracts were held to be based upon "meretricious"
sexual consideration and thus also void.' 5 In short, married couples were not
free to opt out of the state's marital property regime, and unmarried couples
were not free to opt into it. Since the 1970's, however, this bifurcated system
has lost much of its rigidity because contract has largely supplanted status as
a legal basis for the regulation of the mutual property rights of couples.
Prenuptial agreements are now typically upheld when they regulate the
property settlement for a divorce prosecuted upon legally recognized
grounds.16  Contracts governing property relations between unmarried
cohabitants are also generally upheld if they are not expressly founded on the
consideration of meretricious services.17 Thus, most states now set mere default
rules governing the mutual property rights of both married and unmarried
couples.'8 This trend has reduced the differences between married and
unmarried couples with regard to their mutual property rights, since couples
in either category may usually rearrange these rights by mutual consent. As a
result, contract now provides a functional alternative to marriage as a medium
for regulating the economic aspect of a couple's relationship.
The same cannot be said of the conditions under which a couple may
legally terminate its relationship. While prenuptial agreements and cohabitation
contracts can alter the default rules governing the distribution of property upon
dissolution of a relationship, they cannot alter the conditions under which such
dissolution may take place. As before, prenuptial contracts are void if they
represent a collusive effort to procure a divorce when legally recognized
15. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1208 (Il1. 1979); Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 112
(Cal. 1976).
16. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d at 385-86; Osborne v. Osborne, 428 N.E.2d 810, 815-16 (Mass.
1981). Similarly, probate laws now generally allow the contractual waiver of a surviving spouse's default
rights, such as the right to an elective share, in a decedent spouse's estate. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§ 2-204(a) (1990).
17. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 110.
18. Note that this movement from status to contract is a matter of optional state policy; as such, it is
not without exceptions. For limits on prenuptial agreements, see, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d at 386
(making prenuptial agreements subject to modification upon change of conditions); Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338
So. 2d 1111, 1116-17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (voiding prenuptial agreement for involuntariness); In re
Estate of Benker, 331 N.W.2d 193, 201 (Mich. 1982) (voiding prenuptial agreement for nondisclosure of
husband's financial situation, and creating rebuttable presumption of such nondisclosure under certain
circumstances); UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1983) (voiding premarital
agreements that are involuntary or unconscionable and based on ignorance of one party's financial
situation); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-204(b) (1990) (voiding waiver of spousal rights in decedent's estate
if involuntary or if unconscionable and based on inadequate information). For limits on contracts mimicking
marital property rights by unmarried cohabitants, see, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1211 (holding
unenforceable Marvin-type contract claims based on intimate relationship as contrary to state's policy
requiring solemnization of marriage). Contractual regimes governing marital property rights have also been
criticized for enforcing agreements between parties who often possess unequal bargaining power or who
do not negotiate at arms length. See, e.g., Grace G. Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage, 28 UCLA
L. REV. 1125, 1159-70 (1981) (criticizing trend toward resolving unmarried cohabitants' inter se property
rights on basis of parties' intent).
[Vol. 103: 14951500
Same-Sex Marriage
grounds are lacking.' 9 The parties to a marriage may not lower the hurdles
that the state places before a divorce. But the parties cannot raise these hurdles,
either. A corollary of the status theory of marriage is that the state has the
exclusive prerogative to define the grounds for its dissolution. Thus, states may
lower the hurdles to dissolution after a marriage has been celebrated and grant
a divorce under the lowered standard even when one spouse objects.2° Like
the marital property agreements of old, an agreement between the spouses to
abide by their own standards for divorce is still legally unenforceable today.
Just as married couples may not opt out of the state regime for granting
divorces, unmarried couples may not opt into it.2' If divorce is understood as
permission to remarry, then unmarried parties cannot divorce, since they do not
need permission to (re)marry in the first place. Like married couples,
unmarried couples may not contract for more stringent dissolution requirements
than those mandated by the state.22 A member of an unmarried couple is
legally free to walk away from the relationship and marry someone else. Thus,
although unmarried couples may enter into an enforceable contract governing
their reciprocal property rights, they may not enter into an enforceable
commitment to remain together.
In sum, marriage is the only medium whereby two individuals can make
a legally enforceable commitment to remain together. To be sure, the legal
hurdle to divorce is no longer so high that a party who is dissatisfied with a
marriage cannot eventually dissolve it.23 In late twentieth-century America,
marriage does not operate as a guarantee that the couple will stay together.
Nonetheless, because the procedural costs of exiting a marriage are
substantially higher than the (nonexistent) procedural costs of exiting a
nonmarital relationship, marriage does provide a relatively stable legal basis
for a committed relationship. The fact that marriage involves a legally
19. E.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d at 385.
20. In re Marriage of Walton, 104 Cal. Rptr. 472, 475-77 (Ct. App. 1972) (holding that spouse can
have no vested interest in grounds for divorce existing at time of marriage); Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480,
482-84 (1863) (holding that state does not impair validity of contracts by granting legislative divorce);
Buchholz v. Buchholz, 248 N.W.2d 21, 23 (Neb. 1976) (holding that marriage is not protected property
interest but is subject to dissolution on terms chosen by state); Williams v. Williams, 543 P.2d 1401, 1403-
04 (Okla.) (holding that state has absolute power to prescribe conditions of divorce notwithstanding any
stricter vows made by parties in accordance with their religious beliefs), cert. denied and appeal dismissed,
426 U.S. 901 (1976).
21. See De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952,955-56 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (holding same-sex partner's
petition for divorce properly dismissed because two persons of same-sex cannot contract (common-law)
marriage).
22. Any agreement by an unmarried couple to dissolve its relationship only under certain specified
circumstances could, if enforced, prevent each of them from marrying someone else. Such an agreement
would probably be unenforceable as a restraint on marriage. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 189 (1979) ("A promise is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if it is unreasonably in restraint
of marriage.").
23. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text (discussing no-fault divorce regimes).
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enforceable commitment differentiates it fundamentally from alternative forms
of public "commitment" ceremonies or private vows. 24
The genius of marriage is that it allows a couple to come together as a
unit25 -if the couple so chooses. Persons who wish to maintain and
emphasize their absolute legal individuality are free not to marry, even if they
are involved in a profound and satisfying intimate relationship. This option
throws light on the economic "benefits" that third parties sometimes bestow
on married couples. Some lesbian and gay activists criticize the idea of
marriage generally, and same-sex marriage in particular, because they believe
that third-party economic benefits privilege marital relationships over
alternative forms of familial life.26 Yet, the differential treatment that married
partners often receive may not privilege marriage at all; rather, such treatment
may simply reflect the fact that married couples have chosen to operate as a
unit while unmarried persons have not. In that case, marriage would simply
provide an administrable criterion for tailoring benefit programs to the family
structures that different beneficiaries have chosen.
A realistic view of the package of "benefits" received by married couples
supports this conception. Gay and lesbian advocates of same-sex marriage have
understandably focused on those benefits of marriage from which they are
excluded, and gay and lesbian critics have followed suit by objecting to the
way such benefits apparently privilege marriage. The result, however, is that
the burdens associated with marriage are usually ignored. For example, the oft-
cited "benefit" of filing a joint tax return turns out, on closer inspection,
frequently to be a burden-the well-known "marriage penalty," under which
many married couples pay more tax than unmarried couples with the same
joint income.27 The double-edged quality for married couples of this tax
provision is mirrored by others in the Internal Revenue Code, such as those
relating to wealth transfers between spouses (gain is not recognized, but neither
is loss).28 The policy behind these Code provisions is not to privilege married
24. It is precisely this mutually binding aspect of marriage that is missing from the "domestic
partnerships" now recognized in some local jurisdictions. See infra note 36.
25. The use of the term "unit" is not intended to imply that the parties to a marriage lose their separate
identities or that they become a single legal person-marriage no longer merges the legal identity of one
partner (the wife) into that of the other (the husband). Unlike most other types of mutual commitment
recognized by our legal system, however, marriage is not merely based upon the transient economic self-
interest of monadic individuals. Rather, marriage is a legal medium whereby two individuals can commit
themselves to joining together as a unit in pursuing a common life project.
26. See, e.g., Ettelbrick, supra note 10, at 405.
27. The "marriage penalty" results when the couple consists not of one wage earner and one non-wage
earner, but of two wage earners whose separate incomes are roughly similar. Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex
Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, I LAW & SEXUALITY 97, 98 (1991). Compare I.R.C. § l(a), (d) (West
Supp. 1993) (setting income tax rates for married persons filing joint returns and for married persons filing
separately) with I.R.C. § l(c) (vest Supp. 1993) (setting income tax rates for unmarried persons).
28. See Cain, supra note 27, at 98-99 (listing tax-related benefits and burdens applicable only to
married couples); see also Nitya Duclos, Some Complicating Thoughts on Same-Sex Marriage, I LAW &
SEXUALITY 31, 52-54 (1991) (listing non-tax-related benefits and burdens associated with marriage).
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couples, but to arrive at a realistic "tax unit" when a couple, rather than an
individual, operates as an economic unit.29
Marriage bundles benefits with burdens. When married couples and
unmarried individuals receive differential treatment, it should ideally reflect the
differences in their circumstances. Because most married couples pool their
resources in a single household, it makes sense for the state to treat them as
a single economic unit when evaluating their entitlements and liabilities under
programs based on financial need or ability to pay. In the context of a mobile
society with an unstable labor market, it may also make sense to extend job-
related benefits, such as health insurance and pensions, to the spouses of
employees, since these spouses might have sacrificed their own direct access
to such benefits in order to keep a mobile household intact. Such spousal
benefits do not necessarily represent undeserved windfalls-unless one
assumes that the norm for measuring the fairness of all systems of
compensation is the individual who maximizes his or her own earnings and
benefits without regard to long-term personal commitments.
Critics of marriage have objected that under this approach to third-party
benefits, state and private recognition of intimate relationships turns on "a
simple certificate of the state," rather than on the actual "relationship among
people."30 In fact, real state intrusion occurs when legally recognized forms
for indicating family status are absent, not when they are available. The
problems become apparent in the celebrated case of Braschi v. Stahl
Associates,31 in which the term "family," used in New York regulations to
describe persons who cannot be evicted from a rent-controlled apartment when
the leaseholder dies, was construed to include "two adult lifetime partners
whose relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and
financial commitment and interdependence." 32 Because the lifetime partners
involved in Braschi were both men, they could not enter into a legal marriage
with each other. Given the absence of legally recognized forms for indicating
family status in this context, the court was no doubt correct to reject the
requirement of a marriage license as placing "fictitious legal distinctions"
before "the reality of family life. '33 Nonetheless, when courts delve directly
into the "reality" of family life, it places heavy burdens not only on the
judiciary, but also on the family subjected to its scrutiny. Consider the inquiry
suggested in Braschi:
The determination as to whether an individual is entitled to
noneviction protection should be based upon an objective examination
29. See Cain, supra note 27, at 129.
30. See, e.g., Ettelbrick, supra note 10, at 404-05.
31. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
32. Id. at 54.
33. Id. at 53.
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of the relationship of the parties. In making this assessment, the lower
courts of this State have looked to a number of factors, including the
exclusivity and longevity of the relationship, the level of emotional
and financial commitment, the manner in which the parties have
conducted their everyday lives and held themselves out to society, and
the reliance placed upon one another for daily family services. These
factors are most helpful, although it should be emphasized that the
presence or absence of one or more of them is not dispositive since
it is the totality of the relationship as evidenced by the dedication,
caring and self-sacrifice of the parties which should, in the final
analysis, control.34
It is little wonder that other courts in other circumstances have found this
inquiry to be beyond their institutional competence.35 Bureaucratic state
institutions can assess the formalities of family life better than the realities,
especially when the realities take nontraditional forms. Unfairness develops
only when such formalities are denied to particular groups-such as same-sex
couples.36
34. Id. at 55 (citations omitted); cf. Blumberg, supra note 18, at 1127, 1131 (proposing, in context of
opposite-sex couples, a legally recognized state of "cohabitation" based on "objective criteria" similar to
those in Braschi, adding that "[wihich elements should be used to define unmarried cohabitation depends
on which are salient to the particular legal context in which the issue arises"); Ellen Kandoian,
Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility of a Shared Moral Life, 75 GEO. L.J. 1829, 1870
(1987) (proposing definition of de facto marriage, modeled on law of business partnerships, as "association
of two persons to carry on a shared life").
35. See, for example, Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988), which denied a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress to a plaintiff who witnessed his unmarried opposite-sex partner's death,
because the allowance of such claims "would impose a difficult burden on the courts. It would require a
court to inquire into the relationship of the partners to determine whether the 'emotional attachments of the
family relationship' existed between the parties, and whether the relationship was 'stable and significant."'
Id. at 587 (citations omitted); see also Coon v. Joseph, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873 (Ct. App. 1987) (denying
recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress to same-sex partner because couple was not legally
married). See generally Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Approach
to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640 (1991). Private institutions, such as insurance
companies, also may resist the institutional burdens involved in identifying "functional families." See, e.g.,
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Pizzi, 505 A.2d 160, 161-62 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
36. To be sure, the state could-and should-recognize alternative formalities, such as "domestic
partnership" registration, that enable a couple to indicate its preference for being treated as a unit for some
purposes without any other state regulation of its relationship. Like marriage, domestic partnership
ordinances allow two adults to register as a couple with a governmental body. They differ from marriage
primarily in that they do not regulate the partners' reciprocal property rights and that they allow either
partner to terminate the domestic partnership at will. See, e.g., San Francisco, Cal., Domestic Partnership
Ordinance § 4 (Jan. 15, 1991), reprinted in LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW, supra note 10, at 439-43
(ordaining that domestic partnership be unilaterally terminable by either partner via death, marriage, or
notice to other partner). Thus, a registered domestic partnership allows a couple to define the boundaries
of its relationship without the state-imposed terms of marriage. Hunter, supra note 7, at 23-25. These
considerations appear to explain why a critic of same-sex marriage such as Paula Ettelbrick endorses the
domestic partnership movement. See Ettelbrick, supra note 10, at 405.
Because of problems of opportunism, however, domestic partnership can never completely replace
marriage as a criterion for administering programs that are differentially tailored to couples and individuals.
Differential treatment creates space for opportunism by couples posing as noncouples and by noncouples
posing as couples. For example, the policy of sometimes treating a couple, rather than its separate members,
as the appropriate unit for taxation would be undermined if a couple could pick and choose among the
marriage-related provisions of the tax code it wished to have applied to it or could choose married or
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In sum, marriage provides a unique legal medium through which intimately
related adults can, if they choose, make a binding commitment to each other
to act as a unit for many purposes. The partners can rely on this commitment
in their dealings with each other, and third parties can rely on it in their
dealings with both. Marriage is thus a crucial framework for overcoming the
atomistic individualism that pervades our social and legal order. This function
of marriage has nothing to do with gender.37 It is equally relevant to couples
of the same and of the opposite sex. Yet courts that have considered the issue
have held that the fundamental right to marry is reserved only to unions of one
man and one woman.38 What is the rationale behind the courts' gendered
conception of this fundamental right?
II. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO MARRY
The Supreme Court has long recognized that marriage is a legal construct,
a status defined exclusively by the state (although entered only by consent of
the parties). 39 The Court has also held, however, that the states do not possess
a free hand in limiting access to marriage, because the right to marry is a
constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right. There is an obvious tension
between the states' power to define marriage and their obligation not to
interfere substantially with decisions to enter into a marital relationship. A
resolution of this tension requires a conception of what marriage is and why
it is constitutionally protected. Part I sketched a provisional answer to these
questions in terms that are indifferent to the relative genders of the couple.
This Part reviews the Supreme Court's major decisions concerning the right
to marry and then lays out the reasons that other courts have offered for
treating this right as necessarily limited to opposite-sex couples.
unmarried tax status on the annual advice of its accountant. The state has a legitimate interest in an
administrable test for distinguishing couples from individuals, a test that is not too easy to evade by
opportunistically switching statuses whenever profitable. Because exiting (and thus entering) marriage
involves costs that are not insignificant, marital status provides such a test, whereas domestic partnership
status does not.
37. Of course, this function of marriage may have something to do with "procreation" insofar as
couples who wish to raise children will usually choose to marry in order to provide a stable basis for their
familial relationship. This connection between marriage and procreation is, however, entirely unlike that
asserted by some courts when they contend that the fundamental right to marry does not extend to same-sex
couples. See infra Part III.B.
38. See supra note 3.
39. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888) (upholding legislative divorce granted ex parte). The
Maynard Court quoted an earlier state case with approval:
"When the contracting parties have entered into the married state, they have not so much
entered into a contract as into a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest
not upon their agreement, but upon the general law of the State, statutory or common, which
defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations .... The reciprocal rights arising
from this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law determines from time to time, and
none other."
Id. at 211 (quoting, with changes in punctuation, Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480, 483 (1863)).
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A. Defining Marriage Versus Prohibiting Marriage
The Supreme Court first held a state statute unconstitutional because it
infringed the fundamental right to marry in Loving v. Virginia,g° which struck
down Virginia's antimiscegenation statute. Loving is probably best known for
the large portion of the decision that is based on the Equal Protection Clause.
Yet the Court also rejected the Virginia law because it impermissibly infringed
the Lovings' fundamental right to marry.4' The brevity of Loving's
fundamental rights analysis left much about the scope and weight of the right
to marry undecided. It is significant, however, that mixed-race marriages,
particularly between blacks and whites, had long been legally forbidden and
42 Cniee gisculturally vilified throughout almost the entire nation. Considered against
this background, Loving represents an unmistakable principle that is relevant
to same-sex marriage: The right to marry is not circumscribed by longstanding
legal or cultural exclusions from marriage, no matter how deeply rooted in the
nation's traditions and history.
The tensions inherent in the idea of a fundamental right to marry played
a larger role in the next major marriage decision of the Court, Zablocki v.
Redhail.43 At issue in Zablocki was a Wisconsin statute that prevented
indigent persons from marrying if they could not meet their preexisting child
support obligations."4 The Zablocki Court emphatically reaffirmed Loving's
holding that the right to marry is fundamental, and it classified this
fundamental right as an aspect of the constitutional right of privacy.
4
Because the Wisconsin statute directly and substantially interfered with the
fundamental right to marry, and because none of the state's proffered
40. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
41. Id. at 12. In Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810
(1972), the court sought to reduce Loving's fundamental rights holding to a replay of its equal protection
holding: "Virginia's antimiscegenation statute, prohibiting interracial marriages, was invalidated solely on
the grounds of its patent racial discrimination." Id. at 187. But this reading of Loving is plainly wrong. The
second part of Loving mentions the state's use of a racial classification only as a potential justification for
limiting the fundamental right to marry, a justification which was then rejected as inadequate to save the
statute: "Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man' .... To deny this fundamental freedom on so
unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes.., is surely to deprive all the
State's citizens of liberty without due process of law." Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
42. The first antimiscegenation law in the colonies was enacted in Virginia in 1691 and thus antedated
the Constitution by almost a century. Thirty-one states still had such laws at the end of World War II;
sixteen states still had them in 1966, shortly before Loving was decided. See Trosino, supra note 8, at 97-
98. In the Dred Scott decision, Chief Justice Taney cited the antimiscegenation laws of several states,
including Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, as evidence that blacks could
not be citizens of the United States; such laws represented the fact that "intermarriages between white
persons and negroes or mulattoes were regarded as unnatural and immoral, and punished as crimes, not
only in the parties, but in the person who joined them in marriage." Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393, 409, 413-16 (1857).
43. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
44. Id. at 387.
45. Id. at 384.
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justifications for this interference could meet the level of heightened scrutiny
imposed by the Court, the statute was struck down.46
In reaching this result, the Court sought to distinguish between laws
through which the state interferes with the decision to marry and laws through
which the state simply exercises its traditional power to define the legal
incidents of marriage:
By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry,
we do not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates
in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be
subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regulations
that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the
marital relationship may legitimately be imposed.47
Under Zablocki, the state's power to define the legal relationship of marriage
does not encompass the power to exclude persons from it.48 If same-sex
couples do have a fundamental right to marry, the state may not negate that
right simply by defining marriage as a union between two persons of opposite
sexes, just as it could not defeat the fundamental right of mixed-race couples
to marry simply by defining marriage as a union of two persons of the same
race. Nonetheless, the scope of the fundamental right to marry cannot be
completely divorced from how marriage is defined-from what marriage
is-for the simple reason that this right is not implicated by prohibitions on
relationships that cannot meaningfully be called "marriages" in the first
place.49 The fact that the state does not recognize same-sex marriages would
46. Under the standard used by the Court, a statute that substantially interferes with the decision to
marry "cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely
tailored to effectuate only those interests." Id. at 388. This Note does not consider the question whether
there may in fact be any state interests that might meet this level of scrutiny and thereby save the
constitutionality of prohibitions of same-sex marriage. Rather, it simply argues that the fundamental right
to marry does extend to same-sex couples, and that such prohibitions must therefore meet the heightened
level of scrutiny advanced in Zablocki.
47. Id. at 386.
48. The need to draw the distinction between defining marriage and excluding persons from it may
explain why Justice Marshall's majority opinion overlays its relatively straightforward fundamental rights
approach with a veneer of equal protection analysis: It construes the statute as defining a class of persons
who have outstanding child support obligations and then subjects this classification to heightened scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause because it interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right. Id. at 375-
77, 388. It is clear that it is the statute's interference with the fundamental right to marry that is driving
Justice Marshall's analysis; absent this fundamental right, there would be nothing impermissible about the
classification employed, since the class of persons with outstanding child support obligations is not suspect
or quasi-suspect for equal protection purposes. Justice Stewart objected to the invocation of equal protection
for precisely this reason: "The problem in this case is not one of discriminatory classifications, but of
unwarranted encroachment upon a constitutionally protected freedom." Id. at 391-92 (Stewart, J., concurring
in the judgment). Despite the validity of this objection, Justice Marshall's invocation of equal protection
analysis aptly indicates that the state may not use its power to define marriage in a manner that excludes
an identifiable class of persons from marrying.
49. The separate concurrences in the judgment by Justices Stewart and Powell appear to reflect this
idea. While both Justices agreed that the Constitution imposes limits on state regulation of marriage, they
also argued that many valid regulations of marriage necessarily have the effect of excluding some persons
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not run afoul of the fundamental right to marry if marriage were by nature
incompatible with same-sex unions.
Thus, under Zablocki it is necessary to ask whether marriage itself
excludes same-sex couples-or whether the state arbitrarily excludes same-sex
couples from marriage. The answer cannot turn on the fact that the state has
built gender-based conditions into the eligibility requirements for marrying.
One must look beyond the fact that same-sex couples are currently prohibited
from marrying and ask whether this prohibition is reasonably connected to the
broader functions and purposes of marriage as a legal relationship.
B. Can Tradition Justify Exclusion?
To many people, there is an obvious justification for excluding same-sex
couples from marriage: Marriage is and always has been limited to persons of
the opposite sex. That's just how marriage has traditionally been defined. No
doubt, this response has a certain commonsense appeal. And it has also
appealed to several courts that have considered the matter. The Minnesota
Supreme Court, for example, found that marriage is by nature limited to
opposite-sex couples because "marriage as a union of man and woman ... is
as old as the book of Genesis., 50 Likewise, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
took judicial notice of the fact that "marriage has always been considered as
the union of a man and a woman."'"
This traditional exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage may be
relevant to the constitutional right to marry, because the Supreme Court has on
occasion stated that the existence of fundamental rights is to be determined by
reference to "those liberties that are 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."' 52  Courts have therefore looked to traditional definitions of
from that legal relationship. Id. at 392 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that states may
legitimately prohibit marriage between siblings, persons with venereal disease, or persons who are already
married); id. at 399 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that state regulation of marriage
includes bans on incest, bigamy, and homosexuality, as well as fault requirements for divorce).
50. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). One
might quarrel with the accuracy of this claim, however. At best, Genesis appears to be authority for the
institution of marriage as a union of one man and several women. See Genesis 29:1-30:24 (narrating story
of Jacob's marriage to more than one woman at same time); cf 1 Kings 11:3 (stating that Solomon had 700
wives, in addition to 300 concubines). The history of marriage is neither as monolithic nor as monogamous
as the Baker court suggests. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79
VA. L. REV. 1419, 1435-84 (1993) (reviewing history of same-sex unions throughout Western and non-
Western history). If one ignores several significant nineteenth-century religious movements, however, the
Minnesota court's description probably holds true for most of the history of the United States. Yet, as the
present Section of this Note argues, the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage throughout American
history is simply irrelevant to whether the fundamental right to marry extends to such couples. Eskridge
argues that his historical survey of marriage undermines essentialist arguments against same-sex marriage.
Id. at 1485. This Note has a different goal: to provide a holistic reading of American marriage law that is
equally compatible with same-sex and opposite-sex marriage.
51. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973).
52. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
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marriage to limit the scope of the fundamental right to marry. The Hawaii
Supreme Court, for example, rejected a fundamental rights challenge to the
prohibition of same-sex marriage because the court did "not believe that a right
to same-sex marriage is ... rooted in the traditions and collective conscience
of our people. ' 3
Unfortunately, the Hawaii court's fundamental rights approach simply
assumes what should be the result of its inquiry. That is, it assumes that the
"right to same-sex marriage" must stand on its own feet because it is not
encompassed by the well-established right to marriage simpliciter. The
plaintiffs' claim, however, was that the right to marry-which is undoubtedly
deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition-extends to same-sex
couples, too. In other words, they claimed the same right to marry as everyone
else, not a special right to marry reserved for same-sex couples. Consider the
analogy to the Lovings' fundamental rights challenge to Virginia's
antimiscegenation law. The Lovings claimed the right to marry, pure and
simple. But what if the Court had interpreted this as a claim to a "right to
mixed-race marriage" and had then inquired into the pedigree of that narrowly
defined right? The result could not have been the same.54 This is simply one
manifestation of a ubiquitous feature of legal reasoning: The answer to any
question usually depends on the level of generality at which the issue is
framed. Should the issue be framed in terms of a (more general) fundamental
right to marry or in terms of a (more specific) fundamental right to marry
someone of the same sex?
Justice Scalia has suggested that there is an easy way to select the correct
level of generality at which to frame such issues, at least when constitutionally
protected fundamental rights are at stake. On his proposal, one should always
"refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or
denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified," because this
provides a bright-line rule for delimiting the right and thereby forestalls
arbitrary judicial decisionmaking.55 And at least one same-sex marriage case
has expressly adopted this "most specific level" approach in choosing to frame
the issue in terms of a "right [of] persons of the same sex to marry one
another."
56
53. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. 1993) (rejecting plaintiffs' fundamental rights claim to
same-sex marriage under federal and state constitutions). This ruling is especially significant because the
Hawaii court did rule in favor of the plaintiffs' equal protection challenge to the same marital
prohibition--the only American tribunal to have issued this type of favorable ruling. See id. at 64, 67
(finding that prohibition of same-sex marriage employs sex-based classification and is therefore subject to
strict scrutiny under equal protection provisions of state constitution).
54. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
55. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion).
56. Dean v. District of Columbia, No. 90-13892, slip op. at 2-4 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 2, 1992).
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The problems with Justice Scalia's "most specific level" approach are,
however, legion." One serious objection is that it puts the methodological
cart before the fundamental rights horse: It chooses a rule for the putative
merit of its rigidity, rather than because it reflects the character of the
constitutional rights in question. Moreover, the result of this methodological
approach is anything but neutral: It gives the narrowest possible interpretation
to fundamental rights by constitutionalizing exceptions to them. Far from
cabining judicial discretion, it simply entrenches at the methodological level
one Justice's narrow conception of fundamental rights.58 At the same time,
the procedural gain that supposedly justifies this substantive loss is illusory:
The "most specific level" standard does not provide a bright-line rule to guide
judicial discretion in particular cases, because traditions do not come in tidy
packages in which the "most specific level" is identifiable or obvious. Because
levels of generality are relative, judicial discretion inevitably comes into play
when judges label a description of a tradition the "most specific" one. 9
The "most specific level" methodology would also require overruling the
fundamental rights holding of Loving v. Virginia. In Loving the Court did not
redescribe the couple's fundamental right to marry at a more specific level as
the right to marry someone of another race. The Court itself recently cited this
example when it firmly rejected the "most specific level" methodology as
inconsistent with its precedents:
It is ... tempting ... to suppose that the Due Process Clause
protects only those practices, defined at the most specific level, that
were protected against government interference by other rules of law
when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. But such a view would
be inconsistent with our law ... Marriage is mentioned nowhere in
the Bill of Rights and interracial marriage was illegal in most States
in the 19th century, but the Court was no doubt correct in finding it
to be an aspect of liberty protected against state interference by the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause in Loving v.
Virginia.
60
57. The problems are so legion that only one other Justice concurred in the footnote in which this
methodology was set forth by Justice Scalia, and two other Justices expressly dissented from that footnote
even though they joined the remainder of the opinion. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part, joined by Kennedy, J.) (refusing to join footnote 6 of Justice Scalia's opinion); see also
id. at 139-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (rejecting "most specific level" methodology).
58. Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1057, 1093-94 (1990).
59. Id. at 1090-93. This judicial discretion becomes arbitrary when the "most specific level"
methodology is itself selectively applied in some cases but not in others. In Dean v. District of Columbia,
No. 90-13892, slip op. at 3-4 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 2, 1992), the court expressly rejected the view that this
methodology must be applied in all fundamental rights cases yet "recognize[d] that such a mode of analysis
may be useful and appropriate in particular instances," including the same-sex marriage litigation that was
before it. It is difficult to imagine a more naked expression of result-driven jurisprudence than this.
60. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805 (1992) (citations omitted).
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If it was wrong to recast the Lovings' claim at the "most specific level," then
some justification must be given for recasting the analogous claim of same-sex
couples as a more specific "right to same-sex marriage."
The choice of the level of generality at which to describe the claimed right
does not have to be arbitrary. Whether the right of same-sex couples to marry
is one aspect of the more general right to marry, or whether it is a distinct
right that is sui generis, depends on whether there is a meaningful distinction
between marriage in general and same-sex marriage in particular. The answer
cannot be assumed at the beginning of the constitutional inquiry. It must
instead be the result of an analysis of the legal function of marriage and its
relation to the interests recognized in the constitutional jurisprudence relating
to the right of privacy. The question is whether this body of law justifies
distinguishing between opposite-sex and same-sex couples, or whether this
distinction is no more relevant to the constitutional right to marry than is the
distinction between same-race and mixed-race couples.
6'
C. Procreation as the (Putative) Purpose of Marriage
Several courts have recognized the need to go beyond pointing to the
traditional exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage by giving a reason for
retaining that exclusion or, more precisely, for treating "same-sex marriage"
as altogether different from "marriage" as such, so that the fundamental right
to marry does not encompass the right to marry someone of the same sex. In
the view of these courts, same-sex couples cannot marry because the purpose
of marriage is procreation-which everybody "knows" will never result from
same-sex unions. In the words of one court:
[M]arriage exists as a protected legal institution primarily because of
societal values associated with the propagation of the human race.
Further, it is apparent that no same-sex couple offers the possibility
of the birth of children by their union. Thus the refusal of the state to
61. Tradition may still be relevant to this analysis if it illuminates the historical basis for distinguishing
between same-sex and opposite-sex marriages. But because history does not stand still, this inquiry must
look beyond those rules that remain unchanged-such as the prohibition of same-sex marriage-and
examine the shifting context in which they exist. It may be that the surrounding bodies of law have changed
so drastically that the prohibition of same-sex marriage will be revealed as an unjustifiable atavistic vestige.
See infra text accompanying notes 66-67. Justice Brennan made a similar point in objecting to Justice
Scalia's methodology in Michael H., 491 U.S. at 140-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting). When viewed
dynamically, references to tradition need not be conservative. Justice Harlan stated this point eloquently
at the dawn of the modem era of judicial enforcement of the right of privacy:
[Due Process] has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of
respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of
organized society.... The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country,
having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the
traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing.
Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added), incorporated by
reference in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).
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authorize same-sex marriage results from such impossibility of
62reproduction ....
The idea that marriage "uniquely involv[es] the procreation and rearing of
children within a family" 63 provides a supposed basis for drawing "a clear
distinction between a marital restriction based merely upon race and one based
upon the fundamental difference in sex."'
This interpretation of the purpose of legal marriage appears over and over
again-at least in the same-sex marriage cases.65 But it is always asserted,
never supported. As a result, a salutary attempt at justification becomes a futile
exercise in ipse dixit. Yet, the resort to arbitrary (or result-driven)
jurisprudence is by no means necessary. The courts' procreative account of
marriage can be checked by asking whether procreation is ever treated as the
unique function of marriage elsewhere in domestic relations law. If it is, then
same-sex unions might well be incompatible with marriage. If, on the other
hand, the legal emphasis on procreation vanishes once one leaves the sphere
of cases directly involving same-sex couples, it may be fair to conclude that
the courts' arguments within that sphere are nothing more than ad hoe defenses
of an unjustified tradition of exclusion.
Parts III and IV of this Note undertake this inquiry. Part III argues that,
outside the context of marriage applications by same-sex couples, laws
governing domestic relations do not treat the ability to procreate as a
precondition of marriage. The marital relationship is valued in its own right as
a legal commitment between two intimately related adults, not because it is
sometimes connected with procreation. Part IV arrives at the same conclusion
through an examination of the broader constitutional right of privacy, of which
the right to marry is one aspect. The right of privacy shields citizens from
government interference in decisions relating to family generally, including the
marital relationship between two adults, irrespective of any parent-child
relationships those adults might also have. There is therefore no basis in the
law for the assertion that the fundamental right to marry extends only to
couples who are capable of biological procreation.
62. Singer v. Ham, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. Ct. App.), review denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1008 (1974).
63. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
64. Id. at 187 (emphasis added). This distinction between mixed-race and same-sex marriages fades
considerably when the procreative purpose of marriage is described in slightly different terms, as
"'fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."' Id. at 186 (emphasis added) (quoting
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). The Baker court appears not to have
noticed the ironic ambiguity of defining the purpose of marriage in terms of the reproduction of "the race."
65. Courts have linked the fundamental right to marry with the potential for procreation in the
following same-sex marriage cases: Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1123, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 1980),
aff'd, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982); Dean v. District of Columbia, No. 90-
13892, slip op. at 2-3 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 2, 1992); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 56 (Haw. 1993); Baker
v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d at 186-87; and Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d at 1195.
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IH. MARRIAGE AND PROCREATION
Any examination of the legal connection between marriage and procreation
should not lose sight of the larger legal dynamic in which it is embedded: the
progressive degendering of marriage. "Husband" and "wife" formerly denoted
entirely distinct gender roles-always involving authority for the male and
dependence for the female-with ramifications for every aspect of married
life.66 Today, in contrast, these hierarchical roles have been emptied of
virtually all legal significance. Much of this change took place in the 1960's
and 1970's in response to the dual pressures of the modem feminist movement
and the Supreme Court's application of heightened scrutiny to gender
classifications. Yet these events are but the rapid culmination of a trend that
began as early as the mid-1800's with the enactment of Married Women's
Property Acts in the states. 67
The progressive degendering of marriage has two implications for the
present inquiry. First, it reveals that the mere longevity of the prohibition of
same-sex marriage is a particularly weak justification for its retention, because
the fundamentally gendered legal order that long sustained this prohibition no
longer exists. Second, it suggests that present-day justifications for the
prohibition of same-sex marriage will inevitably exaggerate the one remaining
aspect of marriage that does remain gender-coded: its sometime connection
with the biological act of procreation. But a procreation-centered interpretation
of marriage is not supported by the state domestic relations laws examined in
this Part: laws relating to divorce and annulment (Section A) and laws
governing parental rights (Section B).
A. The Grounds of Divorce and Annulment
When courts have asserted that procreation is the primary purpose of
marriage, same-sex couples have been ready with a simple and obvious reply:
Opposite-sex couples may marry without showing that they possess either the
66. Hunter, supra note 7, at 15-16. Feminist critiques of marriage have spotlighted this power relation
inhering in the traditional definition of the roles of husband and wife. For citations to some of the relevant
literature, see id. at 15 nn.23-24. For Hunter, one of the most significant aspects of allowing same-sex
marriage would be the tendency of such marriages to undermine the residual power dynamic that still exists
between men and women in many marriages, despite the achievement of legal equality. Id. at 16-17.
Feminist critics who argue that same-sex marriage would merely reproduce the power inequality marking
traditional marriage are, in Hunter's view, just as guilty of essentializing the nature of marriage as are the
courts in the same-sex marriage cases. Id. at 18-19. But see Nancy D. Polikoff, Commentary, We Will Get
What We Ask For, 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993) (arguing that history of same-sex unions shows that they
easily reinforce gendered and hierarchical notions of marriage).
67. See generally Richard H. Chused, Late Nineteenth Century Married Women's Property Law, 29
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 3 (1985) (describing effect of Married Women's Property Acts); Jennifer K. Brown,
Note, The Nineteenth Amendment and Women's Equality, 102 YALE L.J. 2175 (1993) (arguing that
Nineteenth Amendment was intended to bring general legal equality to women, not just right to vote).
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ability or the intention to have children. 68 But courts have remained
unconvinced. In their eyes, the absence of a procreative requirement for
opposite-sex couples simply reflects the "fact" that it would be too impractical
and too intrusive to administer a procreation requirement in relation to
opposite-sex couples, who, unlike same-sex couples, are presumed to be
capable of procreating.
69
Whether or not this reasoning is valid for the inception of a marriage, it
cannot be valid for its termination through divorce or annulment, because the
law has rarely shrunk from impractical or intrusive inquiries when a marriage
is terminated. The legally recognized grounds for ending a marriage logically
should refer to the conditions under which a marriage fails to live up to its
legally recognized purposes. If a central purpose of marriage is procreation,
then surely this purpose will be reflected in the law of divorce and
annulment-for example, by making the inability to procreate grounds for
divorce. If, on the other hand, the primary function of legal marriage is the
facilitation of a committed intimate relationship between two adults, then the
grounds for divorce and annulment should center on their relationship inter se,
without reference to their procreative capacities or accomplishments. An
examination of the law of divorce, both before and after the "no-fault"
revolution, bears out the latter rather than the former thesis. Similarly, although
the law of annulment does refer to gender-specific sexual roles, it carefully
avoids referring to the procreative potential of these roles.
Between 1969 and 1985, each of the fifty states adopted a no-fault
provision as part of its divorce code, sometimes as the sole ground of divorce,
sometimes as a supplement to fault-based grounds.7 ° Under the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA), which has been influential in the spread
of no-fault divorce, a court shall enter a decree of dissolution upon a finding
that the marriage is "irretrievably broken" based on evidence that "there is
serious marital discord adversely affecting the attitude of one or both of the
parties toward the marriage."7 Under this standard, a marriage is
"irretrievably broken" if it is marked by "'such a conflict of personalities as
68. See, e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd, 673 F.2d 1036
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971), appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
69. Adams, 486 F. Supp. at 1124-25; Baker, 191 N.V.2d at 187. Such intrusiveness might also violate
the right of privacy under Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See Adams, 486 F. Supp. at 1125;
Baker, 191 NAv.2d at 187.
70. See Legislative Notes, 11 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1274 (Apr. 9, 1985).
71. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 302(a)(2)(ii), 9A U.L.A. 181 (1973); see also CAL. CIV.
CODE § 4506(1) (West 1983) (allowing dissolution of marriage on grounds of "[ilrreconcilable differences,
which have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage"). An alternative criterion of irretrievable
breakdown under the UMDA is that the parties have lived apart for more than 180 days. UNIF. MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE ACT § 302(a)(2)(i) (1973). In some state dissolution statutes, living separately for a period
of time may be the only no-fault provision. See, e.g., N.Y. DOm. REL. LAW § 170(5)-(6) (McKinney 1988).
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to destroy the legitimate ends of matrimony.' ' 72 Thus, like other no-fault
divorce statutes, the UMDA expressly treats the relationship between the
spouses themselves as the sole criterion of a viable marriage.
These broad provisions leave substantial room for judicial discretion in
determining whether a relationship between two spouses actually suffers from
irretrievable breakdown or irreconcilable differences.73 Yet this discretion
does not extend to taking the existence or nonexistence of offspring into
account. The UMDA, like other statutes, "intentionally makes no distinction
between childless marriages and those with minor children. If the parties
establish that their marriage has broken down irretrievably, the court is not
authorized to make a contrary finding because of the impact of a dissolution
of the marriage upon the minor children."74 Thus, the procreative
achievements of a couple are irrelevant to whether a marriage has "broken
down" and should be dissolved.75 The measure of a functioning marriage is,
quite simply, whether the spouses get along with each other, or could if they
tried.
The arcane conceptual system of fault-based divorce, which still exists in
many jurisdictions as an alternative to no-fault, only strengthens this
conclusion. New York, for example, continues to recognize four fault-based
grounds for divorce: cruel and inhuman treatment of the complaining spouse,
abandonment for at least a year, confinement in prison during the marriage for
three consecutive years, and voluntary commission of an act of adultery.
76
The first three of these grounds plainly have to do either with the quality of
the spouses' shared life (cruel and unusual treatment) or with its very existence
(abandonment, imprisonment). The significance of adultery is more ambiguous,
however, for while it seems akin to cruel and unusual treatment, it also has the
potential to result in offspring outside of the marital relationship and might
thereby relate to the alleged centrality of procreation for marriage.77
The finer points of adultery as a legal ground for divorce help resolve this
ambiguity. The procreation-centered thesis is refuted by the fact that the law
does not recognize many potentially procreative acts of adultery as grounds for
divorce but does recognize many other acts of adultery without procreative
72. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 302(a)(2) cmt., 9A U.L.A. 181 (1973) (emphasis added)
(quoting Newman v. Newman, 391 P.2d 902, 903 (Okla. 1964)).
73. For example, CAL. CIV. CODE § 4507 (West 1983) glosses "irreconcilable differences" as "those
grounds which are determined by the court to be substantial reasons for not continuing the marriage and
which make it appear that the marriage should be dissolved."
74. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 305 cmt., 9A U.L.A. 212 (1973). The comment adds that
this had been true under prior law as well.
75. Of course, once it has been determined that the marriage will be dissolved, ascertaining the best
interests of the couple's children is an important task of the court in determining conditions for custody
and support. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT §§ 309, 401-10, 9A U.L.A. 400, 549-671 (1973).
76. N.Y. DONt. REL. LAW § 170(l)-(4) (McKinney 1988).
77. Stoddard writes that at common law "adultery was not the sexual betrayal of one partner by the
other, but the wife's engaging in conduct capable of tainting the husband's bloodlines." Stoddard, supra
note 10, at 398.
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potential as such grounds. Under the New York statute, for instance, adultery
on the part of the defendant spouse is not a ground for fault-based divorce in
three situations: when the defendant's adultery was committed through the
procurement or connivance of the plaintiff (procurement); when the plaintiff
forgave the defendant, either expressly or by cohabiting with the defendant
with knowledge of the adultery (condonation); or when the plaintiff, too, is
guilty of such adultery (recrimination).7 8 Each of these defenses refers to
conduct by the plaintiff and thus relates to whether the defendant's adultery
has impaired the intimate relationship between the two spouses. In the case of
condonation, the harm is repaired by forgiveness; in the case of recrimination,
the defendant's adultery is not the sole cause of marital discord, since the
plaintiff is equally culpable; and in the case of procurement, either or both of
these descriptions might hold true. None of these defenses has anything to do
with the potential for procreation or its absence.7 9 Adultery is not grounds for
divorce because it threatens illegitimate procreation. Rather, as with extreme
cruelty, it is the wrong that adultery inflicts on the innocent spouse that
justifies terminating the marriage.80
An expansion of the definition of adultery beyond what the procreation
theory would predict confirms this view. Adultery as a ground for divorce may
include not only male-female sexual intercourse, but also "deviate sexual
intercourse," including oral and anal "sodomy."8' As a ground for divorce,
adultery includes sexual relations between a spouse and another person of the
same sex.82  In other words, the adultery divorce doctrine equates
nonprocreative sexual activity with potentially procreative activity, and the
allegedly central connection between marriage and procreation is nowhere in
evidence. The conclusion is clear: Adultery is grounds for divorce, not because
of any connection it may have with procreation, but because it interferes with
and undermines the intimate commitment of the married couple.
Like the law of divorce, the law of annulment draws a sharp line between
sexual activity as such and the ability to procreate. The former may be
78. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 171 (McKinney 1988). (A statute of limitations also applies. § 171(3).)
For a nineteenth-century discussion of condonation and recrimination, see Home v. Home, 72 N.C. 530
(1875).
79. Cf. Sayles v. Sayles, 80 N.E.2d 21, 23 (Mass. 1948) (holding that birth of child is not essential
element of adultery as grounds for divorce).
80. Note, however, that under a fault-based regime an unhappy couple may be denied a divorce and
thus the permission to remarry. See, e.g., Home v. Home, 72 N.C. at 533 (dismissing divorce petition with
conclusion "that both husband and wife are two miserable wretches, and the case is too disgusting to be
longer entertained by the Court").
81. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(4) (McKinney 1988) (incorporating the definition of deviate sexual
intercourse in N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.00(2), 130.20(2)). But see NV. v. NV., 226 A.2d 860, 862 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967) (holding that adultery, as ground for divorce, does not encompass sexual conduct
other than [genital] intercourse).
82. See, e.g., Patin v. Patin, 371 So. 2d 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Owens v. Owens, 274 S.E.2d
484 (Ga. 1981); M.V.R. v. T.M.R, 454 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1982); R.G.M. v. D.E.M., 410 S.E.2d 564
(S.C. 1991).
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essential to marriage, but the latter is not. The inability to engage in sexual
intercourse is grounds for an annulment in many jurisdictions. But the cases
carefully distinguish between impotence, or the inability to enter into sexual
relations, and sterility, or the inability to procreate. As one nineteenth-century
decision made clear, we would have to revise our conception of marriage
radically if the ability to procreate were considered so essential for entering the
marital state that its absence would be grounds for annulment:
It is a fact well known to medical science, and familiar in our
common experience, that every woman passes through a climacteric
period ... after which she is incapable of conception, and yet it has
never been suggested that a woman who has undergone this
experience is incapable of entering the marriage state .... It seems
to us clear, therefore, that it cannot be held, as a matter of law, that
the possession of the organs necessary to conception are essential to
entrance to the marriage state, so long as there is no impediment to
the indulgence of the passions incident to that state.
84
Here the sine qua non of marriage turns out to be sex (or "the indulgence of
the passions"), not procreation.
Yet, although sexual activity in marriage need not have any connection
with procreation, courts continue to treat such activity as if it required two
distinct gender roles, one male, the other female. This fixation on gender-coded
sexual roles reveals itself starkly in cases concerning the marriageability of
transsexuals.85 In a leading English case, Corbett v. Corbett,8 6 the court held
that a male-to-female transsexual could not enter into a valid marriage with a
man because (the court believed) no course of sex-change therapy could
"reproduce a person who is naturally capable of performing the essential role
of a woman in marriage. 87 While other cases have rejected Corbett's result,
they have not rejected its emphasis on gender-coded sexual roles. In a carefully
reasoned New Jersey opinion, for example, the court could see no reason why
the state should not recognize the results of a surgical sex-change for the
purposes of marriage-as long as "the postoperative transsexual is ...
83. See David B. Perlmutter, Annotation, Incapacityfor Sexual Intercourse as Groundfor Annulment,
52 A.L.R.3d 589, 596-98 & n.42 (1973).
84. Wendel v. Wendel, 52 N.Y.S. 72, 74 (App. Div. 1898). Note, however, that an annulment may
be obtained for fraud, and that refusal to engage in intercourse without contraception may therefore be
grounds for annulment if the refusing party expressly or impliedly indicated an intention to have children.
There are several New York cases from the 1940's that construe the act of marriage itself as an implied
expression of an intention to have children, so that a concealed intention not to procreate is such a fraud.
See, e.g., Lembo v. Lembo, 86 N.Y.S.2d 206 (Sup. Ct. 1949). These cases appear to be exceptional,
however.
85. For purposes of this discussion, a transsexual is defined as a person who has changed sexes by
altering his or her physical sexual attributes through surgical, hormonal, and behavioral therapies.
86. [19701 3 All E.R. 33 (P. 1970).
87. Id. at 48. In the view of the court, one's gender at birth could not be altered even by the natural
development of the organs of the opposite sex. Id. at 47.
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possessed of the full capacity to function sexually as a male or female, as the
case may be."88 The court regarded it as axiomatic that two persons of the
same sex could not marry.89 But it also adopted the approach of earlier
annulment cases and focused not on in-born characteristics or the ability to
procreate, but on the ability to engage in sexual intercourse:
[F]or purposes of marriage under the circumstances of this case, it is
the sexual capacity of the individual which must be scrutinized.
Sexual capacity or sexuality in this frame of reference requires the
coalescence of both the physical ability and the psychological and
emotional orientation to engage in sexual intercourse as either a male
or a female.9"
Despite its laudable treatment of this particular transsexual, the New Jersey
court still remains fixated on sex/gender insofar as it fetishizes the ability to
engage in opposite-sex intercourse "as either a male or a female." The cases
concerning transsexuals reveal that the differences in gender that are
supposedly so essential for marriage are nothing more than different positions
in a hypothetical sex act-even when it has no connection to procreation.
Thus, if gender-based access requirements for marriage serve any purpose, it
is only the suspect one of maintaining gender-based sexual and social roles.9
But, to paraphrase Loving, the fundamental right to marry may not be denied
on "so unsupportable a basis" as the en-gendering of distinct sexes. 9z
B. Marriage and Co-Parenting
The ability to procreate has never been an essential prerequisite for
marriage-except when courts try to justify the prohibition of same-sex
marriage. Nonetheless, there is an obvious and important connection between
marriage and having children: Marriage is the culturally and legally favored
88. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 210 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (emphasis added), certification denied,
364 A.2d 1076 (N.J. 1976).
89. Id. at 207-08 (citing Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), Jones v. Hallahan, 501
S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973), and Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971)).
90. Id. at 209.
91. This Note's fundamental rights analysis intersects at this point with an equal protection analysis
based on the use of gender classifications. See supra note 8.
92. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that fundamental right to marry may not
be infringed on "so unsupportable a basis" as reproduction of distinct races).
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setting in which to bring children into the world.93 This connection is entirely
consistent with the idea that the primary function of marriage is to provide a
legal basis upon which two adults can structure a lasting committed
relationship. Children benefit enormously from a stable family setting, 94 and
marriage facilitates such familial stability by allowing two intimately related
adults to make a long-term commitment to each other. Undoubtedly, many
opposite-sex couples decide to marry precisely because they want to provide
this kind of stable family setting for their children. Just as undoubtedly, many
same-sex couples also want to provide the same stable family setting for their
children.
In the same-sex marriage cases, however, the courts seem to regard it as
obvious that "no same-sex couple offers the possibility of the birth of children
by their union." 95 There is a sense in which this is true. Because an egg from
a female and sperm from a male are required for reproduction, two persons of
the same sex cannot be the biological parents of the same child.96 But an
exclusive focus on biology is too narrow. For a realistic picture of parent-child
relationships, biological parenthood must be supplemented by at least two other
categories: legal parenthood and functional parenthood. 97 An adult who is
legally recognized as the parent of a child might not be her biological parent;
adoption is a paradigm for the divergence of biological and legal parenthood.
Similarly, an adult who fulfills the functional role of a parent by providing
love, care, companionship, and discipline for a child might be neither the
child's biological parent nor her legal parent; stepparents, for example,
frequently function as parents, despite the fact that they are "strangers" to their
spouses' children, both biologically and legally. In the reality of family life,
93. The disabilities under which "illegitimate" children long suffered provide dramatic legal evidence
of the favored status of marriage as a locus for childbearing. These disabilities have been understood as
condemnations-not of the child, but of "irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage." Weber v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). In light of the unfairness of penalizing children
for the acts of their parents, classifications based on legitimacy are now subject to heightened scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 8 (1983). Note, however, that the primary
effect of a policy that disfavors childbearing out of wedlock is not so much to promote procreation in
marriage as to discourage procreation outside of marriage.
94. See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN Er AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 3-28
(1973).
95. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. CL App.), review denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1008 (1974).
96. This is true even when modem reproductive technologies are used. For an overview of the basic
scientific facts of reproduction-aiding technologies, see Lawrence J. Kaplan & Carolyn M. Kaplan, Natural
Reproduction and Reproduction-Aiding Technologies, in THE ETHICS OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 15
(Kenneth D. Alpern ed., 1992).
97. For an excellent overview, see Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers, 78 GEO.
L.J. 459, 461-82 (1990). Polikoff argues that the child's interests would be best served if the law were to
recognize the complex reality of family life and expand the legal definition of "parent" to include all adults
who play the functional role of parents in the child's life; in many cases, the child might have more than
two parents. At the same time, Polikoff recommends retaining a strict distinction between this expanded
class of parents, who would possess all parental rights and responsibilities, and nonparents, who would
possess none. See id. at 471-73.
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these three types of parenthood can overlap, intersect, and conflict with each
other in innumerable ways.
These crisscrossing parental statuses can be found among same-sex couples
as well. An individual involved in a same-sex relationship may be a biological
parent (perhaps, but not necessarily, as a result of a previous marriage to
someone of the opposite sex), and the same-sex partner of this biological
parent may serve as the functional second parent to a child raised within the
context of their relationship. In other cases, neither same-sex partner may be
a biological parent, but one may be a legal parent by virtue of adoption, and
both may be functional parents. In still other cases, adoption may allow both
same-sex partners to become the legal and functional parents of the same
children.98 A narrow focus on the biological act of procreation obscures this
simple fact: Many same-sex couples engage in child-rearing together.99
A narrow focus on biological parenthood also obscures the role marriage
plays in this constellation. Same-sex marriage cases treat the possibility of joint
parenthood as a precondition of marriage. In the law, however, this order of
priority is frequently reversed: Being married is actually a precondition of joint
parenthood. Marriage sometimes preempts biology for the purposes of
determining who a child's legal parents are. A widely known case relating to
this tradition is Michael H. v. Gerald D.,"° in which the Supreme Court
upheld a California statute that created an irrebuttable presumption that a child
born to a married woman living with her husband is also the child of the
mother's husband. The California courts had construed this presumption as a
substantive rule of law favoring the familial relationship of legally married
spouses: "given a certain relationship between the husband and wife, the
husband is to be held responsible for the child, and ... the integrity of the
family unit should not be impugned."'0'
Michael H., who offered evidence showing a 98.07% probability that he
was the biological father of the child involved in the case, argued that a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in his parental relationship had been
infringed by this state policy of favoring the integrity of the family. The
Supreme Court disagreed. The mother's marriage was crucial for distinguishing
the case from earlier ones in which the Court had held that a biological father
98. See infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text (discussing same-sex second-parent adoption).
99. For overviews of the legal issues surrounding child custody and adoption by parents involved in
same-sex relationships, see LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW, supra note 10, at 481-536, and NAN
HUNTER Er AL., THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 98-117 (3d ed. 1992).
100. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). The fundamental rights methodology advocated by Justice Scalia in Michael
H. is discussed supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text. The substantive outcome of the case did not
depend on this methodology; indeed, two other Justices joined Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in its
entirety-except for the methodological footnote. See id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
101. Id. at 119-20 (plurality opinion) (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 1005
(1987) (quoting Vincent B. v. Joan R., 126 Cal. App. 3d 619, 623 (1981))). Note, however, that California
would allow the husband or the wife to present evidence showing that the husband was not the father of
the child; under these circumstances, the presumption was not irrebuttable. Id. at 115.
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does have a liberty interest in his parental relationship with his child: "Where
... the child is born into an extant marital family, the natural father's unique
opportunity [to develop a relationship with his offspring] conflicts with the
similarly unique opportunity of the husband of the marriage; and it is not
unconstitutional for the State to give categorical preference to the latter."' 02
But not only is it constitutional to allow marital status to trump biological
paternity in this way, it has also been the legal norm to do so. As Justice
Scalia reminds us, the presumption of legitimacy was "a fundamental principle
of the common law" that "could be rebutted only by proof that a husband was
incapable of procreation or had had no access to his wife during the relevant
period."'0 3 Even today, "the ability of a person in Michael's position to claim
paternity has not been generally acknowledged."'
' 04
Indeed, contemporary statutes have actually expanded the presumption of
paternity beyond the scope of the common-law rule to cover cases in which
the husband is incapable of procreation. The virtually unanimous rule of law
is that a husband who consents to the artificial insemination of his wife with
sperm from a third-party donor is treated as the legal father of any resulting
child.'0 5 In this context, the law combines with modern reproductive
technology to render husband and wife joint legal parents, even when it is
physically impossible, because of the husband's sterility, for both to be the
biological parents of a child. Under these circumstances, marriage becomes the
precondition for procreation, not vice versa.
Biologically speaking, the situation of opposite-sex couples in these
circumstances is virtually identical to that of same-sex couples. In neither case
can both partners be the biological parents of the same child. It is therefore
easy to imagine a legal rule, analogous to that applied to married opposite-sex
couples, which would bestow legal parenthood upon spouses in a same-sex
marriage when one of them is the biological parent of a child. Just such a rule
was applied in Karin T v. Michael T '06 Karin and Michael appeared to be
a typical married couple with two children. When they separated and Karin
sought a child support order, however, Michael denied that he was the father-
the children had been conceived via artificial insemination, and Michael (a.k.a.
Marlene) was, biologically, a woman. Since the court did treat
102. Id. at 129 (plurality opinion) (distinguishing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983)).
103. Id. at 124 (plurality opinion).
104. Id. at 125 (plurality opinion).
105. Michael J. Yaworsky, Annotation, Rights and Obligations Resulting from Human Artificial
Insemination, 83 A.L.R.4th 295, 301 (1991). This rule has even been applied to a case in which a married
woman was artificially inseminated with the sperm of a man who was not her husband in order to bear a
child pursuant to a surrogacy contract with a third man. Thus, the husband was neither the biological parent
nor the intended functional parent of the child. The court nonetheless held that the husband was the legal
father and that his consent, rather than that of the biological father, had to be obtained before the third man
(who had contracted for the surrogacy and was the would-be functional father) could adopt the child. In
re Adoption of Reams, 557 N.E.2d 159, 163-64 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
106. 484 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Fam. Ct. 1985).
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Michael/Marlene as a woman for the purposes of the case, 10 7 the marriage
between this same-sex couple had never been valid. Yet the court could not
ignore the fact that Michael/Marlene was, in a very real sense, the second
parent of her former "spouse's" child:
The actions of this respondent [Michael/Marlene] ... certainly
brought forth these offspring as if done biologically. The contract and
the equitable estoppel which prevail in this case prevent the
respondent from asserting her lack of responsibility by reason of lack
of parenthood. This Court finds that ... respondent is indeed a
"parent" to whom such responsibility attaches.'I8
Fortunately, legal recognition of this type of dual-mother-or dual-
father-arrangement has not been limited to cases in which the partnership
between the parents has dissolved. An increasing number of jurisdictions now
allow second-parent adoption by the same-sex partner of a child's biological
or adoptive parent.'0 9 In a representative District of Columbia case,"l0 each
of two women partners was already the legal parent of one child, one by birth,
the other by adoption. Both the local Department of Human Services and the
court found that adoptions of each child by the other partner would be in the
best interests of the children, for whom the two women already functioned
together as parents. The only possible bar to the adoptions emerged from a
statute that appeared to mandate the termination of all parental rights of a
biological parent upon adoption of his or her child by someone else, the only
exception being for stepparent adoptions, i.e., cases in which the adopter is the
spouse of the biological parent."' The court overcame this statutory hurdle
by finding that an adoption by a same-sex partner resembled the stepparent
adoptions authorized by statute, and the non-birth mother was therefore
allowed to adopt the children without extinguishing the parental rights of the
birth mother."
t2
107. Id. at 782. The clerk who issued the marriage license had apparently not required birth certificates
and had simply assumed that Michael/Marlene was the male she appeared to be. Id. at 781.
108. Id. at 784 (emphasis added).
109. Courts in several jurisdictions, including Alaska, California, the District of Columbia,
Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and Vermont, have approved such same-sex second-parent adoptions.
See NAN HUNTER ET AL., supra note 99, at 117 n.128; Nancy Polikoff, Lesbian Mothers, Lesbian Families,
14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 907, 907 n.2 (1986). These cases are frequently uncontested, and few
have reached the appellate level. Two exceptions are Adoptions of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271
(Vt. 1993), and Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993), both of which allowed second-parent
adoptions by the same-sex partners of the children's natural parents.
110. Adoption of Minor (T.), No. A-269-90, 1991 WL 219598 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 1991).
111. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-312(a) (1989).
112. Adoption of Minor (T.), 1991 WL 219598, at *3. An analogy with stepparent adoptions has also
been drawn in Adoptions of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1276 (Vt. 1993), and in In re
Adoption of Evan, 583 N.YS.2d 997, 1000 (Sur. Ct. 1992). Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass.
1993), reached the same result without relying on the stepparent analogy.
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It is ironic, then, that these same women cannot marry each other because
they are supposedly incapable of "procreating." Legally and functionally
speaking, they have already done so. Same-sex second-parent adoptions allow
"the children of such unions the benefits and security of a legal relationship
with their de facto second parents.""' 3 Yet the parents themselves are denied
the security of a legal relationship with each other. Note the contrast with how
the law treats identically situated opposite-sex couples. Far from denying such
couples the right to marry simply because they are unable to reproduce
biologically, the law allows them to marry and then protects their decision to
form a family by presuming that they are the joint parents of children born into
their household. This legal treatment of parenthood is designed to protect the
"marital family"" 4 regardless of whether the spouses are capable of
conceiving a child together. In these cases, the potential for joint parenthood
is not the precondition of marriage, but its result.
The idea that the "fundamental difference" between the sexes is relevant
to marriage because marriage is centered on procreation cannot be sustained.
The ability to procreate is not and never has been essential for entering into
a marriage. This is reflected both in laws relating to the annulment or
dissolution of marriages and in many laws relating to the parental status of
married couples who are biologically infertile. The supposed "fundamental
difference" between the sexes is relevant to marriage in only one way: The
state prohibits same-sex marriage. But same-sex and opposite-sex couples have
an identical interest in a legal means of securing their familial relationships.
The constitutional right of privacy requires the state to provide this legal
framework.
IV. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The right of privacy prevents the state from taking over the lives of
individual citizens by making basic familial decisions for them. In the case of
decisions relating to marriage, this right imposes an affirmative obligation on
the state: the obligation to create a legal framework for marriage and to open
it equally to adult couples regardless of gender.
The right to be free from state interference in decisions about family is
logically prior to and independent of any abstract right one might have to
113. Adoptions of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d at 1276.
114. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (plurality opinion) (characterizing purpose
of traditional presumption of legitimacy). To be sure, there are many situations in which the integrity of
the marital family should not trump the parental rights of biological parents. The parental rights of
"surrogate" mothers, for example, surely deserve greater protection than those of anonymous donors of
sperm for use in artificial insemination, since birth mothers must carry their children to term. The
problematic character of "surrogacy" may raise higher hurdles for dual-father families than for many other
couples. For a variety of viewpoints on the ethical difficulties posed by reproductive technologies, see
generally the essays collected in THE ETHICS OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, supra note 96.
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engage in sexual conduct. In Bowers v. Hardwick"5 the Supreme Court
affirmed the power of the state to prohibit sexual conduct between two persons
of the same sex. But Bowers does not imply that the state may also prohibit
two persons of the same sex from marrying each other. Engaging in same-sex
sexual conduct might not be a fundamental right, but the right to marry is one.
As a result, the state may not use its power to regulate same-sex sexual
conduct in order to prohibit same-sex marriage."
6
Bowers would provide a basis for upholding the prohibition of same-sex
marriage only if the right to marry depended on a prior right to engage in
sexual activity. But in our constitutional order, the interest in familial choice
is prior to that in sexual liberty. The right of privacy, which encompasses the
right to marry, concerns choices about familial relationships. Its connection
with sexual conduct is merely secondary, derived from this primary concern.
Bowers itself acknowledged this point: The Court's privacy precedents protect
individual choices regarding "family, marriage, [and] procreation," but not, or
at least not directly, choices involving "any kind of private sexual conduct
between consenting adults."' 17 The right of privacy is the right to have the
state not make decisions about one's familial relationships-whether and whom
to marry, whether and when to have children. It is such decisions, rather than
choices about sexual conduct, that represent fundamental aspects of liberty in
our system. Moreover, constitutional protection for decisions relating to
marriage stands on the same level as, and does not depend on, the protection
given to decisions relating to procreation. Privacy shields each of these familial
115. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
116. Similarly, although the state apparently has the power to penalize parents for not satisfying their
child support obligations, it may not deny them the right to marry on this basis. See Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374 (1978) (striking down state law preventing indigent persons froii marrying if they could not
meet their outstanding child support obligations).
117. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191. Thus, Bowers depended crucially on the premise that "[nlo connection
between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other ha[d] been
demonstrated." Id. But if such a connection were demonstrated-if, for example, same-sex couples could
marry-then the right of privacy ought to provide indirect constitutional protection for at least some
"homosexual activity" by virtue of the connection between such activity and familial choice. The sexual
intimacy of married same-sex couples would be protected from state interference under the rationale of
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which ruled that the state may not interfere in a married
couple's private sexual relations. It is the view of the author, moreover, that the right of privacy should also
be extended to protect sexual relations between unmarried persons-whether they are of the same sex or
of opposite sexes. This extension is necessary to protect the familial choice that is at the very core of the
right of privacy. If the state could prohibit all adult sexual activity outside the bonds of matrimony, it
would have the power to force individuals to choose between celibacy and marriage. Since celibacy is not
a live option for most individuals, this "choice" would effectively coerce most people into marital
relationships-and would in this way violate the individual's right to make fundamental choices relating
to family without state coercion. Thus, the right of privacy should shield nonmarital sexual activity from
state interference not so much because such sexual activity is itself intrinsically valued, but because state
control over sexual activity is an inherently coercive means of imposing state-chosen identities upon
individuals. For further elaboration of this connection between the right of privacy and sexual activity, see
Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. RE'. 737 (1989); cf. infra notes 131-46 and
accompanying text (relating Rubenfeld's privacy theory to same-sex marriage).
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choices in its own right; they are coequal aspects of the freedom to determine
one's own familial status without state coercion.
That privacy protects marriage in its own right has been evident at least
since Griswold v. Connecticut."8 In that case, the Court predicated its
holding that the state could not interfere in the couple's private sexual relations
on the fact that the couple was married;" 9 marriage was thus the
precondition of the couple's sexual liberty, not vice versa. In addition, the
holding that the state could not criminalize a married couple's use of
contraceptives refutes the idea that the constitutionally protected status of
marriage depends on a connection with procreation. Indeed, the Griswold Court
extolled marriage as a relationship whose significance lies in the intimate
commitment uniting two adults. 20
The cases surrounding Roe v. Wade,'2' which protect the personal
decision whether to bear or beget a child, also demonstrate that privacy
affords constitutional protection to marriage regardless of whether it is
connected to procreation. The state may not use its coercive power to force
one to become a parent. And the right not to procreate is no less fundamental
inside of marriage than outside of it.'23 Because the right not to procreate is
fundamental, the state may not make procreation a precondition for marriage.
What the right of privacy insulates from the state is not sexual conduct,
but decisions about whether or not to enter into a particular familial
relationship. t2 a The state cannot, without compelling grounds, force someone
to become a parent; nor can it force one not to become a parent. 125 Similarly,
the state cannot, without compelling grounds, prohibit one from entering into
118. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
119. See id. at 486. In a later case, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the Court struck down
a state prohibition on the distribution of condoms to unmarried couples. Eisenstadt did not, however, hold
that unmarried couples have the same sexual liberty as married couples. See infra notes 123-24.
120. In the words of the Court:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the
degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony
in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Grisivold, 381 U.S. at 486.
121. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
122. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2810 (1992).
123. See id. at 2831 (striking down spousal notification requirement as undue burden on abortion
because "[w]omen do not lose their constitutionally protected liberty when they marry"); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into.., the decision whether to bear
or beget a child.").
124. Thus, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 448, and Carey v. Population Services International, 431
U.S. 678, 695 (1977) (plurality opinion)-in which the Court struck down prohibitions on the distribution
of contraceptives to unmarried persons and to minors, respectively-it was assumed that the state could
directly prohibit sexual activity among these groups, but that it could not impose pregnancy and the
resulting birth of an unwanted child as a penalty for violating permissible prohibitions on sexual activity.
125. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that mandatory
sterilization statute implicates a basic civil right).
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a different type of familial relationship, a marriage uniting two adults.' 26 The
Court itself recently summed up its privacy precedents with the conclusion
"that the Constitution places limits on a State's right to interfere with a
person's most basic decisions about family and parenthood."'
127
Loving leaves no doubt that one of these most basic decisions about family
is the choice of whom to marry. 28 In cases that have directly addressed the
issue, however, the courts have said that same-sex marriage and opposite-sex
marriage are entirely different in kind, so that the freedom to choose one's
partner without state interference cannot be extended to the same-sex context.
Against the view of these courts, this Note has argued there is nothing about
marriage as a legal institution that renders it any less suitable for same-sex
than for opposite-sex couples. There is nothing about the legal roles of spouses
that requires that they be of opposite sexes-except the naked and arbitrary
demand that they be of opposite sexes. The respective genders of the potential
spouses are simply irrelevant to the right to marry, and therefore the
prohibition of same-sex marriage can stand only if the state provides a
justification for it that will survive heightened judicial scrutiny.
29
The fundamental right to marry-regardless of gender-stands squarely
within the domain of the Supreme Court's privacy precedents. But what are the
theoretical underpinnings for this position? Typically, the language of privacy
suggests that it is a sphere into which the state may not "intru[de]" or
"enter,"' 130 at least not without a very good reason. The paradigmatic form
of such intrusion is a state-sponsored prohibition or, perhaps, an undue burden
on -the exercise of a fundamental right. In a sense it is also meaningful to
speak of the "prohibition" of mixed-race or same-sex marriage, inasmuch as
mixed-race or same-sex couples are excluded from an otherwise available legal
status. Nonetheless, the language of privacy is misleading in an important
sense: It evokes a Lockean/Lochnerian conception in which a realm of privacy
already exists apart from the state or the law, so that protection of this privacy
only requires the state not to intrude on that realm. Bearing or begetting a
child may fit comfortably into this paradigm. Marrying does not. Once the
prohibition of same-sex marriage is struck down, the state does not walk off
126. Because Anglo-American law has never considered a marriage to be valid unless it was entered
into voluntarily (at least as a formal matter), there have apparently been no constitutional cases considering
the converse of Loving and Zablocki: that the state cannot compel marriage.
127. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2806 (emphasis added).
128. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
129. Majoritarian "notions of morality" are not a sufficiently compelling justification to defeat this
fundamental right. Although the Court has held that such notions of morality are an adequate rationale for
anti-sodomy laws, this holding was based upon the prior finding that such sexual conduct is not a
fundamental right. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196. Where fundamental rights are at issue, as with the right
to marry, majoritarian moral sentiments cannot defeat them; otherwise, every fundamental right would be
defeasible by simple majority vote. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2806-07.
130. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807 (quoting, respectively, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972) and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944)).
1526 [Vol. 103: 1495
Same-Sex Marriage
the scene, but remains in a leading role: It must now sanction and recognize
same-sex marriages. Privacy must be reconceptualized to account for one of
its most central aspects, the right to marry.
Jed Rubenfeld's reading of the right of privacy provides one route to such
a reconceptualization. Rubenfeld criticizes the common understanding of the
right of privacy as protecting "personhood," or the individual's freedom of
self-definition. 3' He proposes that privacy be understood not as the right of
the individual to define her own identity, but as the right not to have an
identity imposed upon her by the state. 32 This subtle shift is important
because it incorporates the state into the definition of privacy from the very
beginning: Privacy exists against the state, not prior to it. From this
perspective, laws appear not merely as prohibitions that prevent an individual
from defining her own identity, but also and especially as productive forces
that serve to impose state-favored identities upon the individual.' 33 Such laws
"standardize" the lives of their targets by compressing them into particular,
narrowly defined molds.' 34 They are, in a word, "totalitarian."'
' 35
Understood as a bulwark against the totalitarian imposition of identities by
the state, the right of privacy emerges directly from our constitutional
commitment to democracy. Privacy prevents the state from subverting its
accountability to the people by totally conditioning their very existences.
36
The right of privacy exists not to protect a "pre-political" private sphere, but
"because democracy must impose limits on the extent of control and direction
that the state exercises over the day-to-day conduct of individual lives.'
' 37
This conception of privacy provides a fitting framework for understanding
the fundamentality of the right of persons of the same sex to marry. There is
nothing problematic about the fact that marriage, as a legal relationship, does
not exist prior to the state, because the privacy that is protected by the
Constitution is not a realm of natural right antedating political life. Privacy
prohibits gender-based marriage restrictions because of the standardizing and
identity-imposing force that they have upon the lives of citizens.
131. Rubenfeld, supra note 117, at 754-55, passim.
132. Id. at 782. Rubenfeld argues that the concept of the individual's true personal identity-whether
defined by the state or by the individual herself-is in fact more repressive than liberating; hence, freedom
should be understood in terms of resisting identities rather than choosing them. Id. at 781; see also id. at
770-82 (deriving outline of and support for argument from French philosopher Michel Foucault). For the
reasons stated below in the text, Rubenfeld's approach to the right of privacy is enormously illuminating
even if one does not entirely agree with his assessment of the idea of personal identity.
133. Id. at 782-83. For example, anti-abortion laws violate privacy not because a woman defines
herself through the prohibited act of abortion, but because such laws allow the state both to impose the
identity of a mother upon a woman and to occupy her entire body and existence, first as she carries the
child to term, then as she raises it. Id. at 782, 788-89.
134. Id. at 786-87 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923) and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)).
135. Id. at 787, 805.
136. Id. at 805.
137. Id. at 804-05.
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Not sanctioning same-sex marriages imposes standardized identities in
several ways. First, it reproduces specific gender roles by enforcing a system
in which gender is always relevant to the possibility of intimate relations, and
by obsessively focusing on a single type of sexual conduct in which men and
women have set, stereotyped positions. 13 8 Seen from this angle, the
"fundamental difference in sex" cited in some same-sex marriage cases139 is
actually produced by the very prohibition it is supposed to justify. The
apparently marginal case of transsexuals reveals the totalitarian implications of
the prohibition: A person who is born male may marry another male only if
he allows himself to be physically, psychologically, and emotionally
transformed in order to "engage in sexual intercourse as... a female."'
40
Gender-based marriage laws have a different type of productive effect on
those who resist their terms, who forgo marriage rather than allow the state to
take over their bodies, their psyches, and their emotional lives. These resisters
will often be gays and lesbians-people who are sexually oriented toward
others of the same gender.'4' When such people resist stereotyped gender
roles by pursuing a same-sex relationship involving meaningful intimacy, the
state denies them the means for making a legally binding commitment in that
relationship. In this way, the law produces and imposes another stereotyped
identity: the identity of the isolated and outcast "homosexual," whose deviant
sexuality is incompatible with committed familial relationships.
41
The totalitarian implications of denying the right to marry are not limited,
however, to the imposition of stereotyped identities based on classifications
like gender and sexual orientation. Whenever the state withdraws access to
marriage, it imposes an identity on those to whom the right is denied, even
when, as in Zablocki, the restriction is based on a classification that is not
otherwise invidious or stereotyping. 43 Consider a case in which the state
138. See Hunter, supra note 7, at 15-17; cf Rubenfeld, supra note 117, at 799-802 (describing the
productive effects of sodomy laws in similar terms).
139. E.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810
(1972).
140. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 209 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), certification denied, 364 A.2d 1076
(N.J. 1976); see also supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
141. As the Hawaii Supreme Court has noted, a same-sex marriage need not involve gays and lesbians
(i.e., "homosexual" persons), or those who are sexually attracted to members of their own sex, just as an
opposite-sex marriage need not involve heterosexual persons, or those who are sexually attracted to
members of the opposite sex. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 51 n. II (Haw. 1993). But since most people
want to marry partners to whom they are sexually attracted, gays and lesbians are probably more likely than
heterosexuals to remain single in response to the prohibition of same-sex marriage.
142. Marc Fajer has documented the extent and significance of the common stereotype (or "pre-
understanding") of lesbians and gay men as persons whose sexuality is "obsessive, and completely divorced
from love, long-term relationships, and family structure." See Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat
Quiche Together?, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 513-14, 537-50 (1992); see also Mary A. Case, Couples and
Coupling in the Public Sphere, 79 VA. L. ReV. 1643 (1993) (exploring problematic status of gay couples
in gay rights litigation). This stereotyped conception of gay sexuality also manifests itself in the Supreme
Court's failure to detect any possible connection between "homosexual activity" and committed familial
relationships such as marriage. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
143. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
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simply repeals all laws governing marriage, effectively eliminating it as a legal
institution. Could this complete absence of state regulation and classification
run afoul of the right of privacy? Yes, because it would relentlessly impose an
identity upon the entire citizenry. Without marriage or a similar legal
institution, every person is reduced to the status of a legal atom. Individuals
lose the legal medium whereby they may join together and appear before the
state and others as a couple. More importantly, without marriage couples are
prevented from making a legally enforceable commitment to remain together
in an intimate relationship. In a world in which the state has monopolized the
power to enforce commitments, the withdrawal of that power from a particular
sphere of life is a productive redeployment of state power in its own right. By
eliminating the legal framework of marriage, the state produces an isolated
legal subject whose capacity to embark upon committed projects with others
is limited to the sphere of self-interested economic transactions-homo
economicus in its purest form. Far from being an unmitigated triumph for
individual freedom, this type of legal atomization is a favored tool of
totalitarian regimes. 44
The state can standardize the lives of its citizens by withholding law as
surely as it can by promulgating law. The forced isolation produced in the
absence of marriage is one example of this. Of course, this defect is not cured
by moving to the opposite extreme, by making marriage compulsory.
Compelled marriage takes over one's life at least as much as enforced isolation
does. The central tenet of privacy is that the state may not make such a choice
for the individual. It does not follow from this tenet, however, that the state
must vanish from the realm of privacy altogether; in that case, marriage would
also vanish as an alternative. Although privacy is a right against the state, it
cannot exist without the state. 145 The right of privacy is not pre-political; it
144. This is a venerable theme in political thought. Tocqueville, for example, remarked the contrast
between the profusion of local attachments in democratic America and the isolating despotism of the
Second Empire, which he saw as the culmination of the long trend in France toward autocratic government
predicated on the atomization and homogenization of the people. See ALEXIs DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE OLD
REGIME AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION at xiii (Stuart Gilbert trans., Anchor Books 1955) (1856). A similar
theme appears in George Orwell's more ominous vision of the totalitarian future, where resistance to the
Party takes the form of love between two people, a love that the Party (through the Ministry of Love) must
obliterate in order to assure the absolute subjugation of its populace. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-
FOUR 167, 282-300 (Harcourt, Brace & World 1949).
145. Because legal marriage cannot exist without the state, the right to marry is unlike another
potential state obligation-providing abortion funding for indigent women-which the Supreme Court has
held not to be implicated by the constitutional right of privacy. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)
(upholding prohibition on use of Medicaid funds for most abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)
(upholding regulation granting Medicaid benefits for childbirth but not for nontherapeutic abortions).
Withholding funding is different from withholding law. The allocation of public resources is almost always
a quintessentially political task requiring a high level of judicial deference. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard,
483 U.S. 587, 598 (1987) (stating that Congress' plenary power to define economic entitlements requires
deferential judicial review). In the Court's view, when the state denies funding it does not entirely eliminate
a right, but merely leaves the would-be recipient no better off than she would have been had the state not
entered the field. A different analysis would be called for if the state had monopolized the field through,
e.g., socialized medicine, so that denial of public services would deny access to a right altogether. See
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arises out of our constitutional commitment to democracy. It is also not pre-
legal. It requires law for its realization.
46
V. CONCLUSION
Some advocates argue that the right to same-sex marriage should be
pursued as a political strategy to attain general equality for lesbian women and
gay men. n7 Marriage is thought to be so privileged in our society that
participation in it would legitimate all same-sex relationships and the
individuals who prefer them. Under the conception advanced in this Note,
however, the state's recognition and regulation of marriage does not privilege
this institution, but merely makes it available to those who wish to structure
their relationships in accordance with it. Ideally, the benefits and burdens
associated with marriage reflect the differences between the situation of a
legally committed couple and the situations of couples and individuals without
such legal commitment. The state's recognition of a couple's choice to
undertake the mutual commitments of marriage is not the same as an
endorsement of that choice. Perhaps many quarters of American society still
view marriage as sacred, noble, and superhuman. 48 Unfortunately, same-sex
couples must reckon with the possibility that the recognition of their right to
marry may lower the status of marriage as much as it raises the status of gays
and lesbians.
The political implications of same-sex marriage do not concern the
perceptions of others. Same-sex marriage directly implicates the citizenship of
lesbians and gays themselves. Through a legal disability created by the state's
denial of a legal framework for committed same-sex relationships, the state
produces gay men and women as a peculiar class of second-class citizens. The
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 510 n.8 (1989).
When the state withholds law, it acts on people's lives in an entirely different way than when it
withholds funding. The denial of a marriage license by the state is an absolute prohibition of the marriage,
not only de facto, as in the denial of abortion funding, but also de jure. The Minnesota Supreme Court
recognized this when it held that the state's statutes did "not authorize marriage between persons of the
same sex and that such marriages are accordingly prohibited." Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186
(Minn. 1971) (emphasis added), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). Unlike the funding of abortions,
the sanctioning of legal marriages is indeed monopolized by the state. The entire import of the privacy
cases relating to marriage is that the state must provide a legal framework for these protected familial
relationships and must not arbitrarily restrict access to them. The right to marry is the right to enter into
a type of relationship that cannot exist without the state. Analogies to government-funded abortions fail to
capture this essential characteristic.
146. Although Rubenfeld himself does not directly address the issue, he appears to stop short of
treating privacy as a constraint on state inaction. For example, he appears to retain the state action/inaction
distinction when he characterizes state-imposed standardization as the affirmative implication of actual legal
prohibitions. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 117, at 783 (referring to "the interdiction by which [the law)
formally expresses itself"). There is no reason, however, why Rubenfeld's approach may not be applied
to certain types of state inaction as well.
147. See, e.g., Stoddard, supra note 10, at 400.
148. Id.; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (describing intimacy of marriage
as "sacred" and its purpose as "noble").
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political implication of the right to marry, like the right of privacy generally,
is to remove this disability, to counteract state-sponsored standardization, and
thereby to prevent the state from becoming the sovereign of its people.

